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Abstract 
The simultaneous ascending auction has proved to be a successful method of auctioning 
many related items. Simultaneous sale and ascending bids promote price discovery, 
which helps bidders build desirable packages of items. Although package bids are not 
allowed, the auction format does handle mild complementarities well. I examine the 
auction design and its performance in practice. 
1 Introduction 
This chapter examines one of the most successful methods for auctioning many related items—the 
simultaneous ascending auction. This auction form was first developed for the U.S. Federal 
Communications Commission’s spectrum auctions, beginning in July 1994, and has subsequently been 
adopted with slight variation for dozens of spectrum auctions worldwide, resulting in revenues in excess 
of $200 billion. The method, first proposed by Paul Milgrom, Robert Wilson, and Preston McAfee, has 
been refined with experience, and extended to the sale of divisible goods in electricity, gas, and 
environmental markets. Here I describe the method and its extensions, provide evidence of its success, 
and suggest what we can learn from the years of experience conducting simultaneous ascending auctions. 
It might seem odd for the simultaneous ascending auction to appear as a method for combinatorial 
auctions, since a key feature of the simultaneous ascending auction, at least in its basic form, is the 
requirement that bids be for individual items, rather than packages of items. As a result, the simultaneous 
ascending auction exposes bidders to the possibility that they will win some, but not all, of what they 
desire. In contrast, all the other combinatorial auction methods discussed in this book, eliminate this 
exposure problem by allowing bidders to bid on packages of items. Nonetheless, I view the simultaneous 
ascending auction, not as a historical curiosity to be supplanted by more powerful combinatorial methods, 
but as an essential method any auction designer should have in his toolkit. The simultaneous ascending 
auction (and its variants) will remain the best method for auctioning many related items in a wide range of 
circumstances, even settings where some of the goods are complements for some bidders, so the exposure 
problem is a real concern. 
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This is not to say that true combinatorial auctions—those that allow package bids—are not also 
important. They are. Rather, my point is that there are many situations where the simultaneous ascending 
auction will do a sufficiently good job in limiting the exposure problem that its other advantages 
(especially simplicity and price discovery) make it a preferred auction method. In other settings, where 
complementarities are both strong and varied across bidders, package bids are needed to improve the 
efficiency of the auction mechanism. 
The simultaneous ascending auction is a natural generalization of the English auction when selling 
many goods. The key features are that all the goods are on the block at the same time, each with a price 
associated with it, and the bidders can bid on any of the items. The bidding continues until no bidder is 
willing to raise the bid on any of the items. Then the auction ends with each bidder winning the items on 
which it has the high bid, and paying its bid for any items won. 
The reason for the success of this simple procedure is the excellent price discovery it affords. As the 
auction progresses bidders see the tentative price information and condition subsequent bids on this new 
information. Over the course of the auction, bidders are able to develop a sense of what the final prices 
are likely to be, and can adjust their purchases in response to this price information. To the extent price 
information is sufficiently good and the bidders retain sufficient flexibility to shift toward their best 
package, the exposure problem is mitigated—bidders are able to piece together a desirable package of 
items, despite the constraint of bidding on individual items rather than packages. 
Perhaps even more importantly, the price information helps the bidders focus their valuation efforts 
in the relevant range of the price space. This benefit of price discovery is ignored in the standard auction 
models, which assume that each bidder costlessly knows his valuation for every possible package (or at 
least knows how his valuation depends on the information of others in the case of non-private value 
models). However, in practice, determining values is a costly process. When there are many items, 
determining precise values for all possible packages is not feasible. Price discovery focuses the bidders’ 
valuation efforts to the relevant parts of the price space, improving efficiency and reducing transaction 
costs. 
To further mitigate the exposure problem, most simultaneous ascending auctions allow bidders to 
withdraw bids. This enables bidders to back out of failed aggregations, shifting bids to more fruitful 
packages. However, I find that bid withdrawals often facilitate undesirable gaming behavior, and thus the 
ability to withdraw bids needs to be constrained carefully. It is my view that price discovery—not bid 
withdrawal—is the more effective way to limit the exposure problem in simultaneous ascending auctions. 
Since July 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has conducted dozens of spectrum 
auctions with the simultaneous ascending format, raising tens of billions for the U.S. Treasury. The   3
auctions assigned thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. These firms provide a diversity of wireless 
communication services now enjoyed by a majority of the population. The FCC is not alone. Countries 
throughout the world now are using auctions to assign spectrum. Indeed, the early auctions in Europe for 
third-generation (3G) mobile wireless licenses raised nearly $100 billion. Auctions have become the 
preferred method of assigning spectrum and most have been simultaneous ascending auctions. (See 
Cramton 1997 and Milgrom 2004 for a history of the auctions.) 
There is now substantial evidence that this auction design has been successful. Resale of licenses has 
been uncommon, suggesting the auction assignment is nearly efficient. Revenues often have exceeded 
industry and government estimates. The simultaneous ascending auction may be partially responsible for 
the large revenues. By revealing information in the auction process, bidder uncertainty is reduced, and the 
bidders safely can bid more aggressively. Also, revenues may increase to the extent the design enables 
bidders to piece together more efficient packages of items. 
Despite the general success, the simultaneous ascending auctions have experienced a few problems 
from which one can draw important lessons. One basic problem is the simultaneous ascending auction’s 
vulnerability to revenue-reducing strategies in situations where competition is weak. Bidders have an 
incentive to reduce their demands in order to keep prices low, and to use bid signaling strategies to 
coordinate on a split of the items. I identify problems with the simultaneous ascending auctions, and 
discuss how to minimize these problems. 
I begin by motivating the design choices in a simultaneous ascending auction and discuss an 
important extension, the simultaneous clock auction, for the sale of many divisible goods. Then I describe 
typical rules, including many important details. Next I examine the performance of the simultaneous 
ascending auction, identifying both strengths and weaknesses of the approach. I discuss many refinements 
to the auction method, which have been introduced from early experience.  
2 Auction  design 
The critical elements of the simultaneous ascending auction are (1) open bidding, (2) simultaneous 
sale, and (3) no package bids. These features create a Walrasian pricing process that yields a competitive 
equilibrium provided (1) items are substitutes, (2) bidders are price takers, and (3) bid increments are 
negligible (Milgrom 2000, 2004). Of course, these conditions do not hold in practice. Some degree of 
market power is common, at least some items are complements, and bid increments in the 5 to 10 percent 
range are required to get the auction to conclude in a manageable number of rounds.  
Still the simultaneous ascending auction does perform well in practice largely because of the benefits 
of price discovery that come from open bidding and simultaneous sale. These benefits take two forms.   4
First, in situations where bidder values are interdependent, price discovery may reduce the winner’s curse 
and raise revenue (Milgrom and Weber 1982). Bidders are able to bid more aggressively, since they have 
better information about the item’s value. More importantly, when many items are for sale, the price 
discovery lets bidders adapt their bidding and analysis to the price information, which focuses valuation 
efforts and facilitates the aggregation of a complementary package of items. 
The alternative of sequential sale limits information available to bidders and limits how the bidders 
can respond to information. With sequential auctions, bidders must guess what prices will be in future 
auctions when determining bids in the current auction. Incorrect guesses may result in an inefficient 
assignment when item values are interdependent. A sequential auction also eliminates many strategies. A 
bidder cannot switch back to an earlier item if prices go too high in a later auction. Bidders are likely to 
regret having purchased early at high prices, or not having purchased early at low prices. The guesswork 
about future auction outcomes makes strategies in sequential auctions complex, and the outcomes less 
efficient. 
The Swiss wireless-local-loop auction conducted in March 2000 illustrates the difficulties of 
sequential sale. Three nationwide licenses were sold in a sequence of ascending auctions. The first two 
licenses were for a 28 MHz block; the third was twice as big (56 MHz). Interestingly, the first license sold 
for 121 million francs, the second for 134 million francs, and the third (the large license) sold for 55 
million francs. The largest license sold for just a fraction of the prices of the earlier licenses. 
Almost all the simultaneous ascending auctions conducted to date do not allow package bids. Bids 
are only for individual items. The main advantages of this approach is simplicity and anonymous linear 
prices. The auction is easily implemented and understood. The disadvantage is the exposure problem. 
With individual bids, bidding for a synergistic combination is risky. The bidder may fail to acquire key 
pieces of the desired combination, but pay prices based on the synergistic gain. Alternatively, the bidder 
may be forced to bid beyond its valuation in order to secure the synergies and reduce its loss from being 
stuck with the dogs. Bidding on individual items exposes bidders seeking synergistic combinations to 
aggregation risk. 
Not allowing package bids can create inefficiencies. For example, suppose there are two bidders for 
two adjacent parking spaces. One bidder with a car and a trailer requires both spaces. He values the two 
spots together at $100 and a single spot is worth nothing; the spots are perfect complements. The second 
bidder has a car, but no trailer. Either spot is worth $75, as is the combination; the spots are perfect 
substitutes. Note that the efficient outcome is for the first bidder to get both spots for a social gain of 
$100, rather than $75 if the second bidder gets a spot. Yet any attempt by the first bidder to win the 
spaces is foolhardy. The first bidder would have to pay at least $150 for the spaces, since the second   5
bidder will bid up to $75 for either one. Alternatively, if the first bidder drops out early, he will “win” one 
spot, losing an amount equal to his highest bid. The only equilibrium is for the second bidder to win a 
single spot by placing the minimum bid. The outcome is inefficient, and fails to generate revenue. In 
contrast if package bids are allowed, then the outcome is efficient. The first bidder wins both with a bid of 
$75 for the package. 
This example is extreme to illustrate the exposure problem. The inefficiency involves large bidder-
specific complementarities and a lack of competition. In most spectrum auctions conducted to date, the 
complementarities were less extreme and the competition was greater. 
Unfortunately, allowing package bids creates other problems. Package bids may favor bidders 
seeking large aggregations due to a variant of the threshold problem. Continuing with the last example, 
suppose that there is a third bidder who values either spot at $40. Then the efficient outcome is for the 
individual bidders to win both spots for a social gain of 75 + 40 = $115. But this outcome may not occur 
when values are privately known. Suppose that the second and third bidders have placed individual bids 
of $35 on the two spots, but these bids are topped by a package bid of $90 from the first bidder. Each 
bidder hopes that the other will bid higher to top the package bid. The second bidder has an incentive to 
understate his willingness to push the bidding higher. He may refrain from bidding, counting on the third 
bidder to break the threshold of $90. Since the third bidder cannot come through, the auction ends with 
the first bidder winning both spaces for $90. 
Package bidding also adds complexity. Unless the complementarities are large and heterogeneous 
across bidders a simultaneous ascending auction without package bids may be preferred. 
2.1 Clock  auctions 
An important variation of the simultaneous ascending auction is the simultaneous clock auction, 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. The critical difference is that bidders simply respond with 
quantities desired at prices specified by the auctioneer. Clock auctions are especially effective in 
auctioning many divisible goods. There is a clock for each divisible good indicating its tentative price per 
unit quantity. Bidders express the quantity desired at the current prices. For those goods with excess 
demand the price is raised and bidders again express their desired quantities at the new prices. This 
process continues until supply just equals demand. The tentative prices and assignments then become 
final. 
If we assume no market power and bidding is continuous, then the clock auction is efficient with 
prices equal to the competitive equilibrium (Ausubel and Cramton 2004).    6
Discrete, rather than continuous rounds, means that issues of bid increments, ties, and rationing are 
important. This complication is best handled by allowing bidders in each round to express their demand 
curves for all points along the line segment between the start of round prices and the end of round prices. 
Allowing a rich expression of preferences within a round makes bid increments, ties, and rationing less 
important. Since preferences for intermediate prices can be expressed, the efficiency loss associated with 
the discrete increment is less, so the auctioneer can choose a larger bid increment, resulting in a faster and 
less costly auction process. 
A second practical consideration is market power. Although some auction settings approximate the 
ideal of perfect competition, most do not. The auction design needs to address market power issues. Two 
useful instruments are information policy and reserve pricing. By controlling the information that the 
bidders receive after each round of the auction, the auctioneer can enhance the desirable properties of 
price and assignment discovery, while limiting the scope for collusive bidding. Reserve pricing serves 
two roles, providing price discipline in the absence of competition and discouraging collusion by limiting 
the maximum gain from successful collusion. 
3 Typical  rules 
The simultaneous ascending auction works as follows. A group of items with strong value 
interdependencies are up for auction at one time. A bidder can bid on any collection of items in any 
round, subject to an activity rule which determines the bidder’s current eligibility. The auction ends when 
a round passes with no new bids on any item. This auction form was thought to give the bidders 
flexibility in expressing values and building packages of items. Common rules are described below. 
Quantity cap. To promote competition in the aftermarket, a bidder often is limited in the quantity it 
can win. 
Payment rules. Typically payments are received at least at two times: a refundable deposit before the 
bidding begins and a final payment for items won. The refundable deposit often defines the bidder’s 
initial eligibility—the maximum quantity of items that the bidder can bid for. A bidder interested in 
winning a large quantity of items would have to submit a large deposit. The deposit provides some 
assurance that the bids are serious. Some auctions require bidders to increase the deposit as bids increase. 
Minimum bid increments. To assure that the auction concludes in a reasonable amount of time, 
minimum bid increments are specified. Bid increments are adjusted in response to bidder behavior. 
Typically, the bid increments are between 5 and 20 percent. 
Activity rule. The activity rule is a device for improving price discovery by requiring a bidder to bid 
in a consistent way throughout the auction. It forces a bidder to maintain a minimum level of activity to   7
preserve its current eligibility. A bidder desiring a large quantity at the end of the auction (when prices are 
high) must bid for a large quantity early in the auction (when prices are low). As the auction progresses, 
the activity requirement increases, reducing a bidder’s flexibility. The lower activity requirement early in 
the auction gives the bidder greater flexibility in shifting among packages early on when there is the most 
uncertainty about what will be obtainable. 
Number of rounds per day. A final means of controlling the pace of the auction is the number of 
rounds per day. Typically, fewer rounds per day are conducted early in the auction when the most 
learning occurs. In the later rounds, there is much less bidding activity, and the rounds can occur more 
quickly. 
Stopping rule. A simultaneous stopping rule is used to give the bidders maximum flexibility in 
pursuing backup strategies. The auction ends if a single round passes in which no new bids are submitted 
on any item. In auctions with multiple stages (later stages have higher activity requirements), the auction 
ends when no new bids are submitted in the final stage. Few or no bids in an earlier stage shifts the 
auction to the next stage. 
Bid information. The most common implementation is full transparency. Each bidder is fully 
informed about the identities of the bidders and the size of the deposits. High bids and bidder identities 
are posted after each round. In addition, all bids and bidder identities are displayed at the conclusion of 
each round, together with each bidder’s eligibility.  
Bid withdrawal. To limit the exposure problem, the high bidders can withdraw their bids subject to a 
bid withdrawal penalty. If a bidder withdraws its high bid, the auctioneer is listed as the high bidder and 
the minimum bid is the second-highest bid for that item. The second-highest bidder is in no way 
responsible for the bid, since this bidder may have moved on to other items. If there are no further bids on 
the item, the auctioneer can reduce the minimum bid. To discourage insincere bidding, there are penalties 
for withdrawing a high bid. The penalty is the larger of 0 and the difference between the withdrawn bid 
and the final sale price. This penalty is consistent with the standard remedy for breach of contract. The 
penalty equals the damage suffered by the seller as a result of the withdrawal. 
4  Performance of the simultaneous ascending auction 
Since we do not observe the values firms place on items, it is impossible to directly assess the 
efficiency of the simultaneous ascending auction from field data. Nonetheless, we can indirectly evaluate 
the auction design from the observed behavior in spectrum auctions (Cramton 1997, McAfee and 
McMillan 1996). I focus especially on the three US PCS broadband auctions, which I refer to as the AB   8
auction, the C auction, and the DEF auction, indicating the blocks of spectrum that were assigned in each. 
This spectrum is used to provide mobile wireless voice and data communications. 
Revenue is a first sign of success. Auction revenues have been substantial. Revenues in US auctions 
typically have exceeded industry and government estimates. The simultaneous ascending auction may be 
partially responsible for the large revenues. By revealing information in the auction process, the winner’s 
curse is reduced, and the bidders can bid more aggressively. Also, revenues may increase to the extent the 
design enables bidders to piece together more efficient packages of items. 
A second indicator of success is that the auctions tended to generate market prices. Similar items 
sold for similar prices. In the narrowband auctions, the price differences among similar licenses were at 
most a few percent and often zero. In the first broadband auction, where two licenses were sold in each 
market, the prices differed by less than one minimum bid increment in 42 of the 48 markets. 
A third indicator of success is the formation of efficient license aggregations. Bidders did appear to 
piece together sensible license aggregations. This is clearest in the narrowband auctions. In the 
nationwide narrowband auction, bidders buying multiple bands preferred adjacent bands. The adjacency 
means that the buffer between bands can be used for transmission, thus increasing capacity. The two 
bidders that won multiple licenses were successful in buying adjacent bands. In the regional narrowband 
auction, the aggregation problem was more complicated. Several bidders had nationwide interests, and 
these bidders would have to piece together a license in each of the five regions, preferably all on the same 
band, in order to achieve a nationwide market. The bidders were remarkably successful in achieving these 
aggregations. Four of the six bands sold as nationwide aggregations. Bidders were able to win all five 
regions within the same band. Even in the two bands that were not sold as nationwide aggregations, 
bidders winning multiple licenses won geographically adjacent licenses within the same band. 
Large aggregations were also formed in the PCS broadband auctions. Bidders tended to win the same 
band when acquiring adjacent licenses. In the AB auction, the three bidders with nationwide interests 
appeared to have efficient geographic coverage when one includes their cellular holdings. The footprints 
of smaller bidders also seem consistent with the bidders’ existing infrastructures. In the C-block auction, 
bidders were able to piece together contiguous footprints, although many bidders were interested in stand-
alone markets. 
Ausubel et al. (1997) analyze the AB and C auction data to see if there is evidence of local synergies. 
Consistent with local synergies, these studies find that bidders did pay more when competing with a 
bidder holding neighboring licenses. Hence, bidders did bid for synergistic gains and, judging by the final 
footprints, often obtained them.   9
The two essential features of the simultaneous ascending auction design are (1) the use of multiple 
rounds, rather than a single sealed bid, and (2) simultaneous, rather than sequential sales. The goal of both 
of these features is to reveal information and then give the bidders the flexibility to respond to the 
information. There is substantial evidence that the auction was successful in revealing extensive 
information. Bidders had good information about both prices and assignments at a point in the auction 
where they had the flexibility to act on the information (Cramton 1997). The probability that a high bidder 
would eventually win the market was high at the midpoint of each auction. Also the correlation between 
mid-auction and final prices was high in each auction. Information about prices and assignments 
improved throughout each auction and was of high quality before bidders lost the flexibility to move to 
alternative packages. 
The absence of resale also suggests that the auctions were highly efficient. In the first two years of 
the PCS auctions, there was little resale. GTE was the one exception. Shortly after the AB auction ended, 
GTE sold its AB winnings for about what it paid for the licenses. Apparently there was a shift in 
corporate strategy away from PCS. 
5  Demand reduction and collusive bidding 
Despite the apparent success of these auctions, an important issue limiting both efficiency and 
revenues is demand reduction and collusive bidding. These issues become important in multiple-item 
auctions. The efficiency results from single-item auctions do not carry forward to the multiple-item 
setting. In an ascending auction for a single item, each bidder has a dominant strategy of bidding up to its 
private valuation. Hence, the item always goes to the bidder with the highest value. If, instead, two 
identical items are being sold in a simultaneous ascending auction, then a bidder has an incentive to stop 
bidding for the second item before its marginal valuation is reached. Continuing to bid for two items 
raises the price paid for the first. As a result, the bidder with the highest value for the second item may be 
outbid by a bidder demanding just a single unit.  
For example, suppose there are two identical items and two bidders (Large and Small). Large has a 
value of $100 per item ($200 for both); whereas small has a value of $90 for one item and values the 
second at $0. In a simultaneous ascending auction with a reserve price less than $80, the unique 
equilibrium outcome is for each to bid for a single item, so that the auction ends at the reserve price. 
Large prefers ending the auction at the reserve price, winning a single item for a profit of more than $20, 
since to win both items Large would have to raise the price on both items above $90 (it is a dominant 
strategy for Small to bid up to $90 on each), which results in a profit of less than $20. The demand 
reduction by Large harms both efficiency and seller revenues.   10
This logic is quite general. In multi-unit uniform-price auctions, typically every equilibrium is 
inefficient (Ausubel and Cramton 1996). Bidders have an incentive to shade their bids for multiple units, 
and the incentive to shade increases with the quantity being demanded. Hence, large bidders will shade 
more than small bidders. This differential shading creates an inefficiency. The small bidders will tend to 
inefficiently win items that should be won by the large bidders. The intuition for this result is analogous 
to why a monopolist’s marginal revenue curve lies below its demand curve: bringing more items to 
market reduces the price received on all items. In the auction, demanding more items raises the price paid 
on all items. Hence, the incentive to reduce demand. 
The simultaneous ascending auction can be viewed as an ascending-bid version of a uniform-price 
auction. Certainly, for items that are close substitutes, the simultaneous ascending auction has generated 
near uniform prices. However, the incentives for demand reduction and collusive bidding likely are more 
pronounced in an ascending version of the uniform-price auction (Cramton and Schwartz 1999, Ausubel 
and Schwartz 1999). To illustrate this, consider a simple example with two identical goods and two risk-
neutral bidders. Suppose that for each bidder the marginal value of winning one item is the same as the 
marginal value of winning a second item. These values are assumed independent and private, with each 
bidder drawing its marginal value from a uniform distribution on [0, 100]. First consider the sealed-bid 
uniform price auction where each bidder privately submits two bids and the highest two bids secure units 
at a per-unit charge equal to the third-highest bid. There are two equilibria to this sealed-bid auction: a 
demand-reducing equilibrium where each bidder submits one bid for $0 and one bid equal to its marginal 
value; and a sincere equilibrium where each bidder submits two bids equal to its marginal value. The 
sincere equilibrium is fully efficient in that both units will be awarded to the bidder who values them 
more. The demand-reducing equilibrium, however, raises zero revenue (the third-highest bid is zero) and 
is inefficient since the bidder with the higher value wins only one unit. 
Next consider the same setting, but where an ascending version of the auction is used. Specifically, 
view the ascending auction as a two-button auction where there is a price clock that starting from price 0 
increases continuously to 100. The bidders depress the buttons to indicate the quantity they are bidding 
for at every instant. The buttons are “non-repushable” meaning a bidder can decrease its demand but 
cannot increase its demand. Each bidder observes the price and can observe how many buttons are being 
depressed by its opponent. The auction ends at the first price such that the total number of buttons 
depressed is less than or equal to two. This price is the clearing price. Each bidder will win the number of 
units he demands when the auction ends, and is charged the clearing price for each unit he wins. In this 
game, if dominated strategies are eliminated, there is a unique equilibrium in which the bidding ends at a 
price of zero, with both bidders demanding just a single unit. The reason is that each bidder knows that if 
it unilaterally decreases its bidding to one unit, the other bidder will instantaneously end the auction, as   11
argued above. But since the bidder prefers the payoff from winning one unit at the low price over its 
expected payoff of winning two units at the price high enough to eliminate the other bidder from the 
auction, the bidder will immediately bid for just one unit, inducing an immediate end to the auction. Thus, 
the only equilibrium here is analogous to the demand-reducing equilibrium in the sealed-bid uniform-
price auction. The efficient equilibrium does not obtain. This example shows that the incentives to reduce 
demand can be more pronounced in an open auction, where bidders have the opportunity to respond to the 
elapsed bidding. The 1999 German GSM spectrum auction, which lasted just two rounds, illustrates this 
behavior (Jehiel and Moldovanu 2000 and Grimm et al. 2002). 
This example is meant to illustrate that in simple settings with few goods and few bidders, bidders 
have the incentive to reduce demand. Direct evidence of demand reduction was seen in the nationwide 
narrowband auction. The largest bidder, PageNet, reduced its demand from three of the large licenses to 
two, at a point when prices were still well below its marginal value for the third unit (Cramton 1995). 
PageNet felt that, if it continued to demand a third license, it would drive up the prices on all the others to 
disadvantageously high levels. 
An examination of the bidding in the AB auction is suggestive that the largest bidders did drop out of 
certain markets at prices well below plausible values, as a result of either demand reduction or tacit 
collusion. 
Further evidence of demand reduction comes from the C auction. One large bidder defaulted on the 
down payment, so the FCC reauctioned the licenses. Interestingly, the licenses sold for 3 percent more 
than in the original auction. Consistent with demand reduction, NextWave, the largest winner in the C 
auction, bought 60 percent of the reauctioned spectrum. This occurred despite the fact that NextWave was 
not the second-highest bidder on any of these licenses in the original auction. NextWave was able to bid 
aggressively in the reauction, knowing that its bidding would have no affect on prices in the original 
auction. 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) and Brusco and Lopomo (2002) show that for an auction 
format like the FCC’s, where the bidding occurs in rounds and bidding can be done on distinct units, that 
there exist equilibria where bidders coordinate a division of the available units at low prices relative to 
own values. Bidders achieve these low-revenue equilibria by threatening to punish those bidders who 
deviate from the cooperative division of the units. The idea in these papers is that bidders have the 
incentives to split up the available units ending the auction at low prices.  
With heterogeneous goods and asymmetric bidders in terms of budgets, capacities, and current 
holdings of complementary goods, it is unlikely that bidders would be aware of a simple equilibrium 
strategy that indicates which items to bid on and which to avoid. However, bidders in the FCC auctions,   12
especially the DEF auction, took advantage of signaling opportunities to coordinate how to assign the 
licenses. With signaling, bidders could indicate which licenses they most wanted and which licenses they 
would be willing to forgo. Often this communication took the form of punishments. 
Cramton and Schwartz (2002) examine collusive bidding strategies in the DEF auction. During the 
DEF auction, the FCC and the Department of Justice observed that some bidders used bid signaling to 
coordinate the assignment of licenses. Specifically, some bidders engaged in code bidding. A code bid 
uses the trailing digits of the bid to tell other bidders on which licenses to bid or not bid. Since bids were 
often in millions of dollars, yet were specified in dollars, bidders at negligible cost could use the last three 
digits—the trailing digits—to specify a market number. Often, a bidder (the sender) would use these code 
bids as retaliation against another bidder (the receiver) who was bidding on a license desired by the 
sender. The sender would raise the price on some market the receiver wanted, and use the trailing digits to 
tell the receiver on which license to cease bidding. Although the trailing digits are useful in making clear 
which market the receiver is to avoid, retaliating bids without the trailing digits can also send a clear 
message. The concern of the FCC is that this type of coordination may be collusive and may dampen 
revenues and efficiency.  
The DEF auction was especially vulnerable to collusive bidding, since it featured both small markets 
and light competition. Small markets enhanced the scope for splitting up the licenses. Light competition 
increased the possibility that collusive bidding strategies would be successful. Indeed, prices in the DEF 
auction were much lower than prices in the two earlier broadband PCS auctions, as well as subsequent 
auctions.  
From a strategic viewpoint, the simultaneous ascending auction can be thought of as a negotiation 
among the bidders. The bidders are negotiating how to split up the licenses among themselves, but only 
can use their bids for communication. The auction ends when the bidders agree on the division of the 
licenses. Retaliating bids and code bids are strategies to coordinate on a split of the licenses at low prices. 
In addition, bidders with a reputation for retaliation may scare off potential competitors.  
Cramton and Schwartz (2002) found that bidders who commonly use these strategies paid less for 
the spectrum they ultimately won. Further evidence that retaliation was effective in reducing prices is 
seen by the absence of arbitrage between the identical D and E blocks in each market. In particular, there 
was a tendency for bidders to avoid AT&T, a large bidder with a reputation for retaliation. If bidders did 
not care about the identity of the high bidder, they would arbitrage the prices of the D and E blocks, and 
bid against AT&T if the other block was more expensive. This did not happen. Even when the price of the 
other block was 50% higher, bidders bid on the higher priced block 27% of the time, rather than bid 
against AT&T.   13
Following the experience in the DEF auction, the FCC restricted bids to a whole number of bid 
increments above the standing high bid. This eliminates code bidding, but it does nothing to prevent 
retaliating bids. Retaliating bids may be just as effective as code bids in signaling a split of the licenses, 
when competition is weak. 
The auctioneer has many instruments to reduce the effectiveness of bid signaling. These include: 
•  Concealing bidder identities. This prevents the use of targeted punishments against rivals. Unless 
there are strong efficiency reasons for revealing identities, anonymous auctions may be preferable. 
•  Setting high reserve prices. High reserve prices reduce the incentive for demand reduction in a 
multiple-item auction, since as the reserve price increases the benefit from reducing demands falls. 
Moreover, higher reserve prices reduce the number of rounds that the bidders have to coordinate a 
split of the licenses and still face low prices. 
•  Offering preferences for small businesses and non-incumbents. Competition is encouraged by 
favoring bidders that may otherwise be disadvantaged ex ante. In the DEF auction, competition for 
the D and E license could have been increased by extending small business preferences to the D and 
E blocks, rather than restricting the preferences to the F block.  
•  Offering larger licenses. Many small licenses are more easily split up. At the other extreme a single 
nationwide license is impossible to split up. Such extreme bundling may have negative efficiency 
consequences, but improve revenues. 
The inefficiencies of demand reduction can be eliminated with a Vickrey auction or more practically 
with an ascending proxy auction or a clock-proxy auction (see Ausubel and Milgrom 2002 and Chapters 
1, 3 and 5). 
6  Lessons learned and auction enhancements 
The FCC auction rules have evolved in response to the experience of several dozen auctions. An 
examination of this evolution is instructive. Despite many enhancements, the FCC spectrum auctions 
have retained the same basic structure, a strong indication of an excellent initial design. The intent of the 
changes were to reduce speculative bidding, to avoid collusion, and to speed the auction along. 
Elimination of installment payments. A serious inefficiency in the C auction was speculative bidding 
caused by overly attractive installment payment terms. Bidders only had to put down 5 percent of their 
bids at the end of the auction, a second 5 percent at the time of license award, and then quarterly 
installment payments at the 10-year Treasury rate with interest-only payments for the first 6 years. These 
attractive terms favor bidders that are speculating in spectrum. If prices go up, the speculators do well; if   14
prices fall, the speculators can walk away from their down payments. Indeed, spectrum prices did fall 
after the C auction, and most of the large bidders in the C auction defaulted on the payments. As a result 
of this experience, the FCC no longer offers installment payments. Bids must be paid in full when the 
licenses are awarded. 
Click-box bidding. Bidders in FCC auctions no longer enter bids in dollars. Rather, the bidder 
indicates in a click-box the number of bid increments from 1-9 that it wishes to bid above the standing 
high bid. If the standing high bid is 100 and the minimum bid increment is 10%, then the allowable bids 
would be 110, 120, …, 190, corresponding to the allowable increment bids of 1, 2, …, 9. This approach 
solves two problems. First, it eliminates code bidding. Bidders can no longer use the trailing digits of bids 
to signal to other bidders who should win what. Second, it reduces the possibility of mistaken bids. There 
were several instances of bidders adding too many zeros to the end of their dollar bids. With click-box 
bidding, substantial jump bids are permitted but not gross mistakes. 
The downside of click-box bidding is the greater possibility of tie bids. This turns out not to be a 
serious problem. Although ties do occur early in the auction, it is unlikely that the final bid on a license 
involves a tie. Still ties do occur, and so the FCC tie-breaking rule takes on greater importance. The FCC 
initially broke ties with the time stamp. Bids entered earlier have preference. Since bidders often have a 
mild preference for being the standing high bidder, it is common for bidders to race to enter their bids 
early in the round to win ties. Such behavior is undesirable, and so the FCC now uses a random tie-
breaking rule. 
License-specific bid increments. In early auctions, the FCC used the same percentage increment for 
all licenses. This was fine for auctioning a handful of similar licenses. However, when auctioning 
hundreds of heterogeneous licenses, it was found that some licenses would have a lot of bidding activity 
and others would have little activity. To speed the auction along, it makes sense to use larger bid 
increments for more active licenses. In recent auctions, the FCC adjusts the bid increments for each 
license based on the license’s history of bid activity, using an exponential smoothing formula. Percentage 
increments tend to range between 5 and 20 percent, depending on prior activity. More active licenses have 
a larger increment. 
Limit the use of withdrawals. Bid withdrawals were introduced to permit bidders to back out of a 
failed aggregation. The DEF auction had 789 withdrawals. Few if any of these withdrawals were related 
to failed aggregations. Rather, most of the withdrawals appear to have been used as a strategic device, in 
one of three ways: (1) as a signal of the bidder’s willingness to give up one license in exchange for 
another, (2) as part of a parking strategy to maintain eligibility without bidding on desired licenses, and 
(3) to acquire near the end of the auction more preferred licenses that seem to free up after the decline of   15
another bidder. The undesirable use of withdrawals was also observed in other auctions. As a result, the 
FCC now only allows withdrawals in at most two rounds of the auction for any bidder. This enables the 
bidder to back out of up to two failed aggregations, and yet prevents the frequent strategic use of 
withdrawals. 
Faster rounds. The FCC’s auction system now permits much faster rounds than the initial 
implementation. In many auctions, bidding activity is slow in the later part of the auction. Hence, being 
able to conduct 20 or more rounds per day is important in speeding the auction along. 
Minimum opening bids. Early FCC auctions did not use minimum opening bids; any opening bid 
greater than zero was acceptable. The FCC now sets substantial minimum opening bids. These bid limits 
both increase the pace and reduce the potential for collusion. By starting at a reasonably high level, the 
bidders have fewer rounds to resolve their conflicts at low prices. The benefit of collusive strategies is 
reduced.  
7 Conclusion 
A simultaneous ascending auction is a sensible way to auction many items. This approach has been 
used with great success in many high-stake auctions in the last ten years to auction spectrum, energy, and 
pollution permits. The process yields a competitive equilibrium in simple settings. Evidence from practice 
suggests that the desirable properties of the design are largely robust to practical complications, such as 
mild complementarities. However, when competition is weak, then there is a tendency for collusive 
bidding strategies to appear, especially in the fully transparent implementation in which all bids and 
bidder identities are revealed after each round. 
When some items are complements, the simultaneous ascending auction suffers from the exposure 
problem, since package bids are not allowed. To limit this problem, the auction rules typically allow the 
withdrawal of standing high bids. This allows a bidder to back out of a failed aggregation. Interestingly, 
an examination of withdrawals in the FCC spectrum auctions reveals that the withdrawals typically were 
not used for this desired purpose, but rather were mostly for undesirable bid signaling. As a result, current 
auctions limit a bidder’s withdrawals to occur in just a few rounds of the auction. 
Recent experience with simultaneous ascending auctions suggests that there are many advantages to 
the clock variation (Ausubel and Cramton 2004). Most importantly, the ability of bidders to engage in 
tacit collusion through bid signaling is greatly reduced. Demand reduction, however, remains a problem 
in the standard clock auction. However, demand reduction can be eliminated by adding a final proxy 
round at the end of the clock auction. This innovation is the subject of the next chapter.   16
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